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This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make invest-
ments that improve the e®ectiveness of the ¯rm organization under his man-
agement interacts with the replacement policy of the board of directors. We
characterize the optimal compensation package (including severance pay) un-
der governance structures that di®er in the power that the incumbent CEO has
on the board of directors. We explain why yielding the incumbent CEO some
control of the board (entrenchment) can be desirable and o®er predictions on
when this arrangement is optimal. We also examine the correlation between
the elements of his compensation package and the structure of the board.
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11 Introduction
There are substantial di®erences in the control exercised by corporate boards of di-
rectors. In some cases the board can and does ¯re the CEO at will. However, in other
corporations, the board is e®ectively the puppets of the CEO and exerts power only
in extreme situations. The ideal control system, espoused in much of the governance
literature, is one where a board of directors, which is accountable to shareholders,
controls the corporation. This, however, ignores some important interactions between
managerial incentive problems and shareholder activism which we explore here.
We consider a basic corporate governance problem: How to induce a CEO prone
to entrenchment to improve the e®ectiveness of the ¯rm organization while preserving
enough governance °exibility to bene¯t from a potentially valuable replacement. We
examine how the allocation of control in the board of directors and various aspects
of the CEO's compensation can be used to address this problem.
Some of the questions that we consider are: Should shareholders keep total control
of the board of directors or should they yield some control to the CEO? How does
CEO compensation relate to these di®erent board structures? Which roles do the
di®erent parts of the compensation policy play in inducing management to improve
the e®ectiveness of the ¯rm organization and in inducing a selective policy on CEO
replacement?
Formally we develop a simple model of a corporation in which an incumbent CEO
must make private investments to improve the e®ectiveness of the organization under
his management. Examples of these investments are the building of a management
team, the development of a certain corporate culture or the establishment of link-
ages with other ¯rms based on the CEO's personal relationships. In each case the
investments are costly for the CEO to make, are not contractible, and their bene¯ts
may be linked to the CEO's tenure in the ¯rm. After making the investments, a
rival CEO, who can improve either modestly or substantially the ¯rm, may become
2available. Within this setting we discuss the optimal corporate governance structure,
which consists of the optimal CEO compensation and replacement policies.
In our model the presence of control rents plays a central role in determining the
¯rm's corporate governance structure. On the one hand, control rents generate a con-
°ict between the shareholders and the CEO on his replacement. On the other hand,
by interacting with monetary incentives, control rents a®ect the optimal structure of
CEO compensation. Consequently, the ¯rm's governance structure must take into ac-
count the interactions between compensation and replacement when addressing both
the incentive problem present in the CEO's investment decision and the potential
con°ict on CEO replacement.
To implement the optimal compensation and replacement policies we consider two
board structures {\independent" and \CEO-controlled"{ that di®er in the power held
by the incumbent CEO and are complemented by managerial compensation contracts
that include performance-based rewards and severance pay. With independent boards
there is a time-inconsistency problem since shareholders may ex post want to replace
the incumbent more frequently than what would be desirable from the point of view of
his ex ante incentives to invest. With CEO-controlled boards this problem disappears
but instead the possibility of entrenchment (opportunistic resistance to step down)
emerges. In both cases severance pay can play an important, albeit di®erent, role. In
independent boards it helps shareholders to commit to a \softer" replacement policy
and thereby solves the time inconsistency problem. In CEO-controlled boards it helps
them to reduce the resistance of the incumbent CEO to step down and let his rival
take over when the rival can make signi¯cant improvements.
We show that, despite the possibility of entrenchment, yielding control to the CEO
can substantially reduce the need for expensive performance compensation. This ad-
vantage arises because the entrenched CEO can obtain part of his pay by negotiating
an attractive severance package. Since the CEO negotiating power is higher if he has
3previously taken actions that improve the e®ectiveness of the organization, this part
of his compensation will be higher if his e®ort is higher. As we show, by linking re-
wards directly to actions (rather than the noisy signal of them given by performance),
this feature helps to reduce the total cost of incentive compensation. Consequently,
shareholders may ¯nd that a CEO-controlled board is ex ante optimal.
The analysis produces a rich set of practical and empirical implications. First we
identify the circumstances that favor the desirability of CEO-controlled boards vis-a-
vis independent boards. Everything else equal, we predict that CEO-controlled boards
dominate when standard performance compensation is not very e®ective (e.g., because
of a too noisy linkage between managerial decisions and corporate performance) and
when entrenchment temptations are not very strong (e.g., because managerial control
rents are small). Secondly we ¯nd that severance pay is more likely to be used and
will tend to be larger in CEO-controlled boards than in independent boards, while
the sensitivity of pay to performance will generally be lower in the former than in
the latter. Moreover, if corporations di®er in the size of their managers' control
rents, severance pay and performance-based compensation will appear as substitutes
(negatively correlated) across independent boards and as complementary (positively
correlated) across CEO-controlled boards.
We conclude the analysis considering the e®ects of takeovers, and takeover threats,
on the corporate governance system. Takeovers are redundant under an indepen-
dent board {shareholders already have full control of the replacement decision{ but
may undermine the CEO's power to resist his replacement under a CEO-controlled
board. Strong takeover threats, which e®ectively leave the CEO replacement de-
cision in shareholders' hands, would preclude governance through CEO-controlled
boards. Moderate takeover threats, however, may improve the performance of a
CEO-controlled board since, as we show, they may allow a selective replacement
policy even without severance pay.
4Our analysis is related to various strands of the literature on corporate governance.
First it relates to work on boards of directors, that has also focused on their role in
replacing managers. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1994) study the substitutability between
the disciplinary roles of the board of directors and the takeover market under di®er-
ent degrees of directors e®ectiveness in assessing management quality. Maug (1997)
examines the substitutability between boards and capital structure as instruments for
corporate restructuring. Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) study the dynamics of board
composition taking into account the power of the incumbent CEO in selecting and
retaining board members, thereby creating endogenous entrenchment. Also Adams
(1998) and Warther (1998) have centered their analysis on information problems and
the ex post e±ciency of the replacement decision. Instead we stress the ex ante
incentive and commitment problems concerning this decision.
Our paper also relates to the literature on managerial compensation. Our main
¯nding {that CEO-controlled boards can lead to renegotiations that allow sharehold-
ers to reduce the performance sensitivity of compensation contracts{ elaborates on
a point ¯rst made by Holmstrom (1979) about the desirability of making incentive
compensation contingent on any piece of information related to managerial actions.
Our CEO-controlled board can help to solve the incentive problem partly because
renegotiation makes the incumbent manager's ¯nal compensation contingent on his
previous investment decision. This insight is thus similar to Scharfstein (1988), who
argues that takeovers can create value for shareholders by implicitly making manage-
rial compensation depend on the raider's information about the ¯rm.
We also revisit some of the insights from the literature on the time inconsistency
problem associated with shareholders' control of decisions a®ecting the manager's
tenure. For instance, Stein (1988) shows that protecting managers from excessive
takeover pressure may improve their incentives to undertake long-term investments.
Titman (1984) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) examine the role of capital struc-
5ture in the context of the ¯rm's liquidation and/or reorganization policy. Berkovitch
and Israel (1996) consider its role in the speci¯c context of managerial replacement.
They notice that, if replacing the existing manager involves an increase in risk, then
leverage as well as the introduction of some \conservative" debtholders on the board
of directors provide means to ¯ne tune the aggressiveness of shareholders' replacement
policy. A similar reasoning leads Berkovitch, Israel, and Spiegel (1998) to analyze cap-
ital structure in interaction with managerial compensation. In our paper, the time
inconsistency problem shapes the optimal compensation contract under an indepen-
dent board, where severance pay in particular plays a role similar to debt in the last
two papers.
Finally, our discussions on the role of severance pay in independent boards and
under takeover threats relate to the abundant literature that has shown the potentially
value enhancing e®ect of takeover defenses, including Knoeber (1986), the above-
mentioned Stein (1988), Harris (1990), Berkovitch and Khanna (1990), Israel (1991),
Israel (1992), and Sarig and Talmor (1997). We complete the picture on the di®erent
uses of severance pay by showing its utility to shareholders also in the case of CEO-
controlled boards, even without takeover threats.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Sections 3 and 4 characterize the optimal CEO compensation and the replacement
policies corresponding to an independent board and a CEO-controlled board, respec-
tively. Section 5 compares both types of board, discusses the factors that determine
the optimality of one or the other, and derives the main empirical implications of the
analysis. Section 6 introduces takeovers. Section 7 concludes.
62 The Model
2.1 Agents, technologies, and the replacement decision
We consider a ¯rm that operates in a risk neutral economy where the market rate
of return is normalized to zero. The ¯rm has a project that yields a terminal cash
°ow x which equals R in case of success and 0 in case of failure.1 The probability of
success depends on the e®ectiveness of the ¯rm organization under the manager in
charge. The ¯rm is initially run by an incumbent CEO who, in some circumstances,
can be replaced with a rival manager. Managers have no wealth, are protected by
limited liability, and their reservation utilities are zero.2
The probability of success under the incumbent CEO and under his rival are
denoted by p and q, respectively. The incumbent CEO can increase the probability
of success under his management from pL to pH = pL + ¢ by undertaking a costly
¯rm-speci¯c human capital investment (e.g., by devoting e®ort to building an e®ective
management team). This investment has a private utility cost B.
After the incumbent CEO has determined p, the uncertainty about the discovery
of a rival manager is resolved. We think of q as a characteristic that relates to the
rival's ability or some unmodelled human capital investment that will determine the
e®ectiveness of the ¯rm organization under his management. If a rival is discovered,
a replacement decision must be made in order to determine whether the incumbent
CEO continues running the ¯rm (r = 0) or is replaced with his rival (r = 1). To
1The assumption that x = 0 in case of failure is made without loss of generality. Removing it
would simply add innocuous constants to shareholders' expected payo®s.
2Under risk-neutrality, incentive problems make managers appropriate positive net expected pay-
o®s due to wealth constraints and limited liability. These payo®s imply an incentive-related cost
to the ¯rm when they exceed managers' reservation utilities. Assuming that reservation utilities
are zero help us stressing the importance of this cost in determining the ¯rm's optimal corporate
governance structure.
7create a possible con°ict between the incumbent and the shareholders on this decision,
we assume that if the incumbent is in charge up to termination, he receives a non-
transferable control rent C > 0. Thus shareholders who only care about transferable
cash °ows face an incumbent who also cares about his non-transferable control rent.
The con°ict will show up whenever the incremental expected cash °ow associated with
replacing the incumbent is not high enough to compensate for C, that is, (q¡p)R < C.
In these cases, whether the incumbent CEO ends up replaced or not will depend on
whether the shareholders have total control of r or the incumbent CEO can somehow
block his own replacement.
The Coasian argument whereby e±cient renegotiation will lead to internalize the
\loss" of C does not necessarily work because the incumbent manager has no wealth.
In particular, when shareholders have total control of r it is possible that the incum-
bent would be willing, but is unable, to \pay" in order to keep C, so he ends up
replaced. In contrast, if he can block his own replacement, he may always decide to
remain in charge.
We capture both the possibility and the absence of con°ict on the replacement
decision by considering that three mutually exclusive events may occur. With prob-
ability ¼0, no rival manager is available; with probability ¼L, there is a rival with
q = qL > pH; with probability ¼H, there is a rival with q = qH > qL. Moreover,
we assume that the con°ict only arises when the incumbent chooses pH and the rival
brings qL. Formally,
pLR + C < qLR < pHR + C < qHR: (1)
Hence, on cash °ow grounds shareholders will prefer qL to pH, while the incumbent,
even if he is o®ered the whole cash °ow gain from his replacement, (qL ¡ pH)R, will
rather prefer to keep his control rent C.
82.2 Information and contracting
The contracting possibilities are limited by veri¯ability problems. The decision p
of the incumbent CEO and the quality q of the rival manager, when available, are
observable to the parties involved in the renegotiation on replacement. Yet we assume
that p and q are not (directly or indirectly) veri¯able, so contracts cannot directly
set a compensation scheme or a replacement rule contingent on p and q. In contrast,
the replacement decision r and the terminal cash °ow x are veri¯able.
We assume that shareholders are interested in inducing the incumbent manager
to invest.3 Hence contracts have to tackle two problems. First, the moral hazard
problem: they have to provide the incumbent with incentives for pH. Second, the
problem of implementing an adequate replacement policy: they have to induce the
replacement of the incumbent whenever this creates value for shareholders. The un-
veri¯ability of (p;q) leads to solve these problems by allocating control rights on the
replacement decision r and by establishing a compensation scheme contingent upon
the veri¯able contingencies (r;x). We will refer to the optimal mix of explicit com-
pensation and allocation of control rights as the ¯rm's optimal corporate governance
structure. We focus on compensation schemes of the form (w;s) that pay a bonus
w if the incumbent is not replaced and the project succeeds, and a severance pay s
if he is replaced;4 compensation for the case in which the incumbent is not replaced
and the project fails is set at its optimal value of zero. The possible allocations of
control rights over r are discussed below in the context of the renegotiation where
they become relevant.
3At the end of Section 3 we provide the su±cient condition (10) for this to be the case.
4For simplicity we assume that the severance pay is s no matter the project succeeds or fails.
Considering a performance-based s would complicate the analysis by adding a third dimension to
the contracting problem, but it would not qualitatively change our results.
92.3 Renegotiation and the board of directors
Since the contracts just described are not fully contingent on relevant pieces of infor-
mation (speci¯cally, q), there will generally be renegotiation between the incumbent
CEO and the shareholders once this information arrives. We think of the board of
directors as the institution that conducts these renegotiations. In most ¯rms, the
board has the authority of the shareholders to replace the CEO and nominate a suc-
cessor. Nevertheless, the board typically hears the CEO in charge before making
any important decision and, very often, some or even a majority of directors, though
formally intended to represent the interest of shareholders, are members of the in-
cumbent management team. Hence, there are many conceivable degrees of alignment
between the positions of the board and the shareholders.
We assume that when a rival manager is discovered, the board meets with the
incumbent CEO in order to bargain on his possible replacement. The outcome of these
negotiations is a replacement decision and, possibly, new terms for the compensation
of the incumbent {say, a new bonus w0 if he remains in charge or a new severance
pay s0 if he steps down in favor of his rival. We model these negotiations as a simple
one-stage bargaining game between the incumbent and the shareholders in which the
former makes a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to the latter.5
Thus, the initial contract will a®ect the outcome of the renegotiations by deter-
mining the threat points (or status-quo payo®s) of each party. We are considering
two cases. In an independent board the residual right of control of the replacement
decision is fully allocated to a representative of the shareholders. In contrast, in a
CEO-controlled board, the shareholders still have the formal initiative on replacement,
but the incumbent CEO can e®ectively veto his own dismissal, which thereby can only
5Our results also hold if with probabilities ¸ and 1¡¸, that represent the (exogenous) bargaining
powers of each party, one party takes the initiative and makes a take-or-leave-it o®er to the other
party.
10take place under his consent.6
2.4 Sequence of events
The following time line summarizes the sequence of events in the model.















Figure 1. The sequence of events
We can distinguish ¯ve dates, t = 0;1;2;3;4. At t = 0 shareholders design a corporate
governance structure, that is, de¯ne the residual rights of control of the replacement
decision r and a compensation scheme (w;s) for the incumbent CEO. At t = 1
the incumbent makes an investment decision p that determines the e®ectiveness of
the organization under his management. At t = 2 the uncertainty concerning the
discovery and type of a rival is resolved. (We will henceforth use q = 0 to represent the
case where no rival is discovered.) At t = 3 having observed p and q; renegotiation on
replacement takes place at the board of directors. The outcome of the renegotiation is
a replacement decision r and the ¯nal compensation scheme (w0;s0) for the incumbent.
Finally at t = 4 the terminal cash °ow x realizes and the compensation to the
incumbent is enforced according to (w0;s0).
6In practice the replacement decisions of the board of directors can be \controlled" by the CEO in
the above sense if there is a majority of loyal directors who are willing to vote against his dismissal.
113 The Independent Board
This section studies the functioning of corporate governance and the design of CEO
compensation when the residual right to replace the incumbent CEO is fully allocated
to the shareholders. We try to capture the operation of a board of directors in which, if
there is no agreement on doing the opposite, the directors that represent shareholders'
interest are strong enough to impose their preferred replacement decision.
We want to ¯nd the compensation scheme (w;s) which is optimal in this case.
Before starting, it is convenient to clarify the trade-o®s in place. There is a moral
hazard problem that interacts with the replacement decision. The issue is to provide
incentives for pH at a minimum compensation cost to shareholders. When (p;q) =
(pH;qL) the gain in expected cash °ow associated with replacing the incumbent does
not exceed the control rent C that he loses. Then, while ex post shareholders may have
no reason to care about C; ex ante they might be willing to give up the incremental
expected cash °ow that would associate with qL if by allowing the manager to keep
C they could save enough on expected pecuniary compensation. The reason why
this may actually be the case is that with (p;q) = (pL;qL) the ¯nal replacement
decision would always be r = 1 (see assumption (1)) so the incumbent may internalize
that investing to improve the e®ectiveness of his organization increases by ¼L his
probability of keeping C:
But how can shareholders commit not to replace the incumbent once his invest-
ment is sunk and a rival manager has become available? In our contracting frame-
work, a properly chosen severance pay s provides the solution to this time inconsis-
tency problem: it can dissuade shareholders from replacing the incumbent, but only if
(p;q) = (pH;qL). Unfortunately, a positive s has the undesirable e®ect of increasing
the cost of replacing the incumbent when q = qH: As a result, a trade-o® emerges
between the net savings associated with a lower w and the costs of, ¯rst, forgoing
the potential cash °ow gains when q = qL and, secondly, paying a positive severance
12pay s when q = qH: This trade-o® allows us to identify the circumstances in which
a positive severance pay may be an ingredient of the optimal compensation scheme
under an independent board.
For the formal analysis, we proceed backwards. We start looking at the renegoti-
ation stage in order to characterize the replacement outcome associated with a given
contract (w;s) under each pair (p;q). We study later how the contract a®ects the
investment incentives of the incumbent CEO. Finally, we compute the value of the
¯rm to its shareholders and determine which contract is the best.
3.1 Renegotiation and the replacement decision
Consider a given initial compensation contract (w;s) at the stage where p has already
been chosen and a rival manager with q = qL;qH has been discovered. A non-trivial
replacement decision r has to be made, possibly after the renegotiation of the initial
compensation scheme. When the incumbent manager and the representatives of the
shareholders meet at the board of directors, they know that if no successful agreement
is reached, the decision will correspond to the latter.
We denote the (hypothetical) replacement decision of the shareholders in case of
no agreement by d. Clearly shareholders would keep the incumbent manager (d = 0)
if and only if the expected cash °ow that he can generate net of the bonus w that he
would receive in case of success, p(R¡w); is larger than the expected cash °ow that
the rival can generate net of the severance pay s that the incumbent would receive if
replaced, qR ¡ s: This condition is equivalent to
s ¸ pw + (q ¡ p)R: (2)
If the inequality is reversed then shareholders would make d = 1. Importantly, setting
a severance pay that does (not) satisfy condition (2) simply determines d = 0 (d = 1)
as the threat point of the incumbent and the shareholders when renegotiating the
13initial compensation scheme. The ¯nal decision on r will di®er from d in those cases
where adopting a di®erent replacement decision can be mutually bene¯cial to both
parties.
By examining the various renegotiation possibilities, we get the following result.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 With an independent board, the renegotiations about the replacement
of the incumbent manager under an initial contract (w;s) and a given pair (p;q) will
yield the following outcome:
1. When (q¡p)R > C; the replacement decision is r = 1 and the expected pecuniary
compensation to the CEO is W = minfpw + (q ¡ p)R; sg:
2. When (q ¡ p)R · C; there are two possible cases:
(i) if s < (q ¡ p)R; then r = 1 and W = s;
(ii) if s ¸ (q ¡ p)R; then r = 0 and W = minfpw; s ¡ (q ¡ p)Rg:
Proposition 1 con¯rms that (q ¡p)R · C is a necessary condition for the incum-
bent manager to keep his job; otherwise, the incumbent manager and the shareholders
can reach an agreement whereby both bene¯t from the replacement of the incumbent.
But (q ¡ p)R · C does not su±ce for r = 0: Ex post shareholders do not care about
C; but only about cash °ow. They only \internalize" C if a severance pay s of at
least (q ¡ p)R absorbs all the potential cash °ow gain from r = 1: In contrast, the
replacement outcome does not depend on the size of the bonus w. This asymmetry
re°ects the operation of the manager's wealth constraint as well as the fact that the
board is independent (shareholders fully control the \default" replacement decision
d). For example, suppose (q ¡ p)R · C and s ¸ (q ¡ p)R; then if w is too high,
the renegotiation will make w0 low enough to guarantee the continuation of the CEO.
However, if (q ¡ p)R · C but s < (q ¡ p)R; the incumbent CEO will be unable
14to keep control on the project because shareholders will ¯nd privately pro¯table to
choose d = 1 and the CEO has no money (nor enough concessions in w to make) with
which to convince them to do otherwise.
Notice that under assumption (1) (q ¡ p)R · C only holds in the case (p;q) =
(pH;qL): Hence, this is the only case in which the replacement decision will depend on
the severance pay s set in the initial contract. With p = pL or q = qH; the incumbent
CEO will end up replaced, irrespectively of (w;s).
Proposition 1 fully characterizes r and W in those cases in which a rival manager
becomes available. The outcome when no rival manager is discovered (q = 0) is much
simpler: no replacement takes place and W = pw; following the terms of the initial
contract.
3.2 CEO incentives and the initial contract
When deciding on investment, the incumbent CEO anticipates the replacement de-
cision r and the expected pecuniary compensation W that will follow, perhaps after
renegotiation, each pair (p;q). The incumbent will choose pH only if by doing so the
increase in his expected pecuniary income W and non pecuniary income C (received
if r = 0) exceeds the private cost B of his decision. Compactly written, this incentive
compatibility condition reads
Eq[W + (1 ¡ r)Cj pH] ¡ Eq [W + (1 ¡ r)Cj pL] ¸ B: (3)
Proposition 1 suggests considering a partition of the set of possible initial con-
tracts according to whether they prevent or not the replacement of the incumbent
when (p;q) = (pH;qL): Our next result provides a particularization of the incentive
compatibility condition within each of these sets.
Proposition 2 With an independent board, if the severance pay induces the replace-
ment of the incumbent at (pH;qL); that is s < (qL¡pH)R; then the incentive compat-
15ibility condition holds if and only if
¼0¢w ¸ B: (4)
Otherwise, incentive compatibility requires at least
¼0¢w + ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R] ¸ B; (5)
which is su±cient in the polar case where s = (qL ¡ pH)R:
This result has two substantial implications. First, setting a strictly positive
severance pay can be good for incentives. In particular, by comparing (4) and (5),
one can notice that with the severance pay s = (qL ¡ pH)R rather than zero the
incumbent's expected return from choosing pH increases by ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R];
which is the expected net surplus (including control rents) associated with retaining
him when a rival of type qL becomes available. In terms of the incentive compatibility
condition, this reward reduces the size of the minimum bonus w required to induce
him to invest.
Second, setting a severance pay in excess of s = (qL ¡pH)R is not good for incen-
tives, rather the opposite. It does not modify the replacement policy, but increases
the income that the manager can get by choosing pL and waiting for either the gen-
erous s or the renegotiated severance pay pLw + (q ¡ pL)R that he will receive if a
better manager is discovered. To o®set this e®ect shareholders would have to increase
w: So both in terms of incentives and compensation costs, setting s above (qL¡pH)R
does not have any advantage. We will formally con¯rm this below.
3.3 The optimal initial contract
Shareholders will select the incentive compatible contract (w;s) that maximizes the
value of the ¯rm to them, namely, the expected terminal cash °ow of the project net
of the expected cost of compensating the manager: V = Eq[[(1 ¡ r)p + rq]R ¡ Wj
16pH]. The selection is to be made among the cheapest incentive compatible contracts
of the two sets mentioned above. The ¯nal choice depends upon the comparison of
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I = AR ¡
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¢
[B ¡ ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R]] ¡ ¼H(qL ¡ pH)R; (7)
where A = (¼0 + ¼L)pH + ¼HqH. The result is as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that corporate governance relies on an independent board of
directors. If V ¤
I = V ¤¤










I = 0, so that the incumbent is replaced whenever a rival manager q = qL;qH












I = (qL ¡ pH)R; so the incumbent is replaced if q = qH but not if q = qL:
This result clari¯es the role of golden parachutes in ¯rms governed by an inde-
pendent board of directors: they may be used to substitute for performance-based
compensation. Golden parachutes can be set so as to induce a replacement policy
that makes control rents play a role in rewarding the incumbent CEO for his invest-
ment decision. This allows shareholders to save on more explicit pecuniary compen-
sation {compare the second terms in the RHS of equations (6) and (7). However,
golden parachutes have two negative e®ects. First, they preclude modest managerial
improvements such as qL {whose value appears in the third term in (6). Second, they
rise the cost of introducing major managerial improvements such as qH {hence the
third term in (7). By simply comparing V ¤
I and V ¤¤
I , we could identify the factors
17that determine when the saving on performance-related compensation exceeds these
two costs. We relegate, however, this discussion to Section 5, where we examine the
alternative corporate governance structures as a whole and elaborate on the empirical
implications of our results.
To conclude the section, we must check that shareholders do indeed want to im-
plement pH rather than pL: Notice that in order to implement pL the shareholders
would optimally set w = s = 0 and will replace the manager whenever a rival shows
up. In this case the value of the ¯rm would be
V I = (¼0pL + ¼LqL + ¼HqH)R:
Hence we need that V I < maxfV ¤
I ;V ¤¤





which implies V I < V ¤
I .
4 The CEO-controlled Board
This section considers the functioning of corporate governance and the design of CEO
compensation when the incumbent CEO can veto his own replacement. We associate
this situation with the operation of a board of directors in which the CEO has the
support of a majority of loyal directors who are willing to block his dismissal, unless
it happens under his consent.7
The allocation of veto power to the CEO eliminates the possibility that his control
rents are unwantedly \expropriated" by the shareholders. With an independent board
7Limiting the incumbent's \control" of the board to his own replacement excludes alternative
allocations of control that would turn out to be suboptimal. For instance, the obvious extreme in
which the CEO controls his own compensation package: in reality most corporations prevent this
by delegating authority on compensation to a compensation committee comprised of independent
directors only.
18the severance pay s was used as a credible commitment to limit such expropriation,
and it was valuable in that it allowed shareholders to use part of C as a reward for
e®ectiveness. The same logic does not apply here. Now the CEO can preserve his
control rents (or renegotiate before giving them up) no matter the e®ectiveness of his
management. This may cast doubts on the potential optimality of this arrangement
{which might easily induce too much entrenchment{ as well as lead to the conclusion
that severance pay has no role to play with a CEO-controlled board.
Both conclusions are too precipitate. In a CEO-controlled board savings on
performance-based compensation can occur if the payo® of the incumbent in the
renegotiation leading to his replacement (when qH realizes) increases with the e®ec-
tiveness of his management. This can be achieved by setting a severance pay such
that, if he chooses pL rather than pH and shareholders propose him to leave the ¯rm,
he will step down without further renegotiation, whereas if he chooses pH he can cred-
ibly threaten shareholders to keep running the ¯rm unless they give him part (or all)
of the replacement surplus. Ex ante, this surplus will be seen by the CEO as a direct
reward to pH, allowing shareholders to save on performance based compensation.
In order to characterize the optimal arrangement formally, we proceed like in the
previous section. We ¯rst look at the renegotiation stage to describe the replacement
outcome associated with a given contract (w;s) under each possible choice of p and
realization of q. After that, we study how the CEO's incentives to invest to improve
the e®ectiveness of his organization depend on the contract. Finally, we compute
the value of the ¯rm to its shareholders as a function of the contract variables and
determine which contract is the best.
4.1 Renegotiation and the replacement decision
Consider a given contract (w;s) at the stage where p has already been chosen and
a rival manager q = qL;qH has been discovered. A replacement decision r has to
19be made, possibly after renegotiating the relevant compensation of the incumbent
manager. The incumbent and the shareholders meet at the board of directors knowing
that in the absence of an agreement, the decision r = 1 cannot be made without the
consent of the incumbent.
As before, we denote the (hypothetical) replacement decision in case of no agree-
ment by d. Given that the incumbent CEO has veto power on this own replacement,
this will only occur if, under the initial contract, both him and the shareholders ¯nd
it convenient that he steps down. On shareholders side this requires:
s < pw + (q ¡ p)R (11)
while on the incumbent's side this requires
s > pw + C: (12)
So we will have d = 1 if and only if (q¡p)R > C and s 2 (pw+(q¡p)R;pw+C). As
before, however, the ¯nal decision on r will di®er from d if changing it can bene¯t both
parties. The outcome of the renegotiations is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 With a CEO-controlled board, the renegotiations about the replace-
ment of the incumbent CEO under an initial contract (w;s) and a given pair (p;q)
will yield the following outcome:
1. When (q¡p)R > C; the replacement decision is r = 1 and the expected pecuniary





pw + (q ¡ p)R; if s · pw + C;
s; if s > pw + C:
2. When (q ¡ p)R · C; the replacement decision is r = 0 and W = pw.
Importantly, the ¯nal replacement decision now only depends on whether the cash
°ow gains from replacing the manager (q¡p)R exceed or not the control rent C. This
20con¯rms that, in contrast to the case of an independent board, the severance pay s
does not a®ect the replacement policy. Nevertheless, s is far form irrelevant to the
problem since it a®ects W through its impact on the renegotiation that follows the
discovery of a rival manager.
Notice that when (q ¡ p)R > C the expression for W exhibits a discontinuity
at s = pw + C; that is, the severance pay below which the incumbent can credibly
threaten the shareholders to stay in charge of the ¯rm. Therefore, for given w and
(q ¡ p)R > C, the in¯mum of W is approached as s approaches pw + C > 0 from
above. This ¯nding suggests an interesting role for severance pay in ¯rms governed
by CEO-controlled boards. Clearly, s > pw+C renders the incumbent's threat not to
leave non credible once he has chosen p, which limits his advantage when bargaining
on his replacement with the shareholders. This feature can be used to make the rents
appropriated by the CEO in the renegotiations on replacement an increasing function
of p, o®ering an alternative to performance based compensation.
Finally, as in the case of an independent board, when no rival manager becomes
available, (q = 0), no replacement takes place and W = pw; as stipulated in the
initial contract.
4.2 CEO incentives and the initial contract
When deciding on the investment necessary to improve the e®ectiveness of his or-
ganization, the incumbent CEO evaluates whether doing so increases his expected
pecuniary and non pecuniary income in excess of the private cost B. Since the replace-
ment policy is now independent of the initial contract, we can separate the contract-
sensitive pecuniary part of the incremental income from the contract-insensitive non-
pecuniary one. Moreover, since the choice of p a®ects the latter simply because
(pL;qL) leads to r = 1 whereas (pH;qL) leads to r = 0; the incentive compatibility
21condition for pH reduces to
Eq[Wj pH] ¡ Eq [Wj pL] ¸ B ¡ ¼LC: (13)
In words, the incumbent CEO will invest in increasing the quality of his management
if this rises his pecuniary income in excess of the net non-pecuniary cost B ¡¼LC of
the investment. The term ¡¼LC re°ects that the CEO internalizes that choosing pH
allows him to preserve C when a rival of type qL becomes available.
4.3 The optimal initial contract
Shareholders will select the incentive compatible contract (w;s) that maximizes the
expected terminal cash °ow of the project net of the expected cost of compensating
the manager. Since the replacement decision does not depend on the compensation
contract, the objective function can be written as
V = AR ¡ Eq[Wj pH];
where A : = ¼0pH + ¼LpH + ¼HqH; like in the previous section. Hence shareholders
will simply choose the incentive compatible contract that entails the lowest expected
pecuniary compensation to the CEO.
Proposition 5 describes the optimal contract under the technical assumption
B > ¼H[(qH ¡ pH)R ¡ C]; (14)
which allows us to avoid the discussion of uninteresting corner solutions to the contract
problem {in particular, those in which the bonus w may turn out to be zero.
Proposition 5 Suppose that corporate governance relies on a board of directors con-











D + C, and the incumbent is replaced if q = qH but not if q = qL.
22The optimal severance pay s¤
D makes some of the renegotiations that transfer
income to the CEO occur only if he chooses pH, which increases Eq[Wj pH] relative to
Eq [Wj pL]. This allows reductions in the bonus w and overall savings on managerial
compensation. Speci¯cally, under the optimal contract choosing pH rather than pL
gives to the incumbent CEO an extra cash °ow of (qH ¡pH)R¡C from renegotiating
about his dismissal when qH occurs. This explains why the optimal bonus w¤
D is a
decreasing function of the corresponding expected renegotiation surplus, ¼H[(qH ¡
pH)R ¡ C].
An interesting property of the optimal compensation contract is that the golden
parachute s¤
D and the bonus w¤
D tend to move together. In particular, the factors that
increase w¤
D increase s¤
D as well. Thus, contrarily to the case of an independent board,
severance payments seem to complement (rather than substitute) performance-based
compensation. This provides a testable implication that will be further discussed in
the next section.
To conclude this section, we check that, conditional on the use of a CEO-controlled
board, shareholders do indeed want the incumbent manager to choose pH. Under the
optimal contract derived in Proposition 5, the value of the ¯rm equals:
V
¤
D = AR ¡
pH
¢
[B ¡ ¼H[(qH ¡ pH)R ¡ C]] ¡ ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R: (16)
In contrast, in order to implement pL; the shareholders would just set w = 0 and
s = C; in which case the value of the ¯rm would be
V D = (¼0pL + ¼LqL + ¼HqH)R ¡ (¼L + ¼H)C:
Hence the optimality of pH requires V D < V ¤
D: As in the case of independent boards,
condition (10) su±ces to guarantee the desirability of pH.
235 Optimal Board Design: Determinants and Im-
plications
The analysis in previous sections identi¯es three potentially optimal corporate gov-
ernance structures. Two of them, which will be denoted by I¤ and I¤¤, involve an





tively. The other, which will be denoted by D¤, involves a CEO-controlled board
and the compensation contract (w¤
D;s¤
D). In this section we prove that each of them
may emerge as an optimal corporate governance structure, examine the factors that
determine their optimality, and discuss the empirical implications of the analysis.
5.1 Three potentially optimal structures
We start by showing, with three examples, that any of these structures can be optimal.
We ¯x all parameters except C at the values R = 100; B = 5; pL = 0:5; pH = 0:75;
qL = 0:81; qH = 0:99; ¼L = 1=6; ¼H = 1=6; and compute the contracts and ¯rm value
under three di®erent levels of control rents: 9, 15, and 21:8 The results are reported in
Table 1, where the rows corresponding to the optimal structure appear in bold face.
Table 1. Three examples
C = 9
w s V
I¤ 30 0 65:0
I¤¤ 27 6 61:5











The general comparison of the three structures in terms of pay-for-performance
8These parameter values satisfy the assumptions made in equations (1), (10), and (14).
24sensitivity (w), golden parachutes (s), and turnover frequency (the equilibrium prob-
ability of r = 1) is summarized in Table 2. The results directly come from comparing
the expressions for w and s and the replacement policies characterized in Propositions
3 and 5.9
Table 2. Di®erences across governance structures
I¤ I¤¤ D¤
Pay-performance sensitivity high medium low
Golden parachute none medium high
Turnover frequency high low low
Accordingly, severance pay is more likely to be used and will be larger in CEO-
controlled boards than in independent boards, while the sensitivities of pay to per-
formance will tend to be lower in the former than in the latter. Structure I¤ appears
clearly as the structure closest to the \ideal" governance system espoused in the lit-
erature, while D¤ seems to ¯t the stylized description of a governance system a®ected
by \entrenchment" and I¤¤ combines elements of both of them.
5.2 Factors that determine the optimality of each structure
To further explore the determinants of the optimal structure, we can use expressions
(6), (7), and (16) to de¯ne the frontiers of the regions of the parameter space where
each structure dominates. Figure 2 represents these frontiers in two relevant dimen-
sions: pL; which is a measure of the severity of the managerial incentive problem, and
9To assess the pay-for-performance sensitivity under I¤¤ and D¤; we evaluate w¤
I and w¤
D at the
indi®erence frontier where V ¤¤
I = V ¤
D. It is immediate to check that this condition implies w¤
I > w¤
D.
This is also true whenever V ¤¤
I < V ¤
D: When V ¤¤
I > V ¤
D; there may be cases where the inequality
gets reversed (e.g., in the third panel in Table 1).
25C, which is a measure of the importance of the time inconsistency and entrenchment
problems associated with managerial control rents.10
Figure 2 depicts the rectangle where pL 2 [0; pH] and C 2 [(qL¡pH)R; (qH¡pH)R].
This rectangle is divided by the straight lines L1; L2, and L3; that are de¯ned by the
indi®erence conditions V ¤
I = V ¤¤
I ; V ¤
I = V ¤
D; and V ¤¤
I = V ¤
D; respectively. Their
properties are apparent in the diagram: They pass through the points P1; P2, and P3;
respectively, intersect at a single point in the interior of the rectangle, and have the
relative slopes indicated in the ¯gure; in particular, L2 has a slope greater than that
of L3. In the end, the parameter space splits in three regions which identify when




Figure 2. Optimal structures
10Notice that, for given pH, an increase in pL reduces ¢, which is a key determinant of the size of
w: Intuitively, as ¢ decreases, performance becomes \noisier" as a signal of managerial e®ectiveness,
increasing the cost of providing incentives through performance-based compensation.
11Further details about the derivation of Figure 2 are included in the proof of Proposition 6.
26According to the ¯gure, the \ideal" governance structure, I¤, works well if incen-
tive compensation is highly e®ective (pL is low) or if the control rents are neither
high enough to recommend I¤¤ nor low enough to recommend D¤. The indepen-
dent board with golden parachutes, I¤¤, is the solution when pay-for-performance
is very costly and control rents are large, since in this case solving the time incon-
sistency problem in managerial replacement has a big return in terms of savings in
performance-based compensation. Finally, the CEO-controlled board, D¤, is optimal
when pay-for-performance is again very costly, but control rents are small. Small
control rents allow shareholders to reward the e®ectiveness of the incumbent CEO
with power to bargain on his own dismissal, but without having to pay much for
preventing the entrenchment temptations that, given C; he may have even if he is
not e®ective.12 Summing up, the noisier the link between managerial actions and
performance measures, the less e±cient performance-based compensation becomes.
Both I¤¤ and D¤ use the replacement policy to substitute for performance-based
compensation, but they do it in a very di®erent manner. In I¤¤ the reward to man-
agerial e®ectiveness partly comes from making the CEO to preserve C when modestly
better managers become available. In contrast, in D¤ the rewards to e®ort relate to
how the CEO bargains on the terms of his own dismissal when a signi¯cantly better
manager is discovered. This explains the following result:
Proposition 6 In a sample of ¯rms that di®er in pL and C, an improvement in
the prospects of external managerial innovation (the ratio ¼H=¼L) will increase the
number of CEO-controlled boards and decrease the number of independent boards with
golden parachutes.
This and other predictions coming from previous results are discussed in the next
subsection.
12Note that the severance pay s¤
D required to avoid entrenchment if pL is chosen increases one-
by-one with C:
275.3 Discussion of the empirical implications
We can separate the empirical implications of the analysis in three distinct sets.
The ¯rst refers to the cross-sectional variation in the nature of corporate boards of
directors. The second refers to the use of performance-based compensation. The ¯nal
one contains the predicted relationships among the di®erent (endogenous) instruments
of governance considered so far.
Our model identi¯es managerial control rents as an important determinant of the
structure of the board. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) report that CEO tenure, a
proxy for the size of these rents, is positively related to the probability of nomination
of insiders as directors. If the present value of control rents is larger for younger or
more recently designated CEOs, our model predicts that their control of the board
should indeed be less prevalent. Proposition 6 also predicts a larger incidence of CEO-
controlled boards (vis-a-vis independent boards with golden parachutes) in industries
and periods of time with larger managerial turmoil (e.g., after a major regulatory,
technical or organizational change). If shareholders expect to face more pro¯table
opportunities of replacing the incumbent CEO in the future, they will tend to o®er him
greater \protection" in the form of entrenchment as a means of saving on alternative
pay-for-performance compensation.13
Our analysis also has implications on the use of pay-for-performance compensa-
tion. After the in°uential study by Jensen and Murphy (1990), which advocated
increasing performance sensitivity in top management compensation, there has been
a noticeable growth in the use of incentive compensation {see, for instance, Murphy
13Notice that such a move towards CEO-controlled boards may be accompanied by an increase
in managerial turnover. Increasing ¼H relative to ¼L expands the D¤ region and contracts the I¤¤
region, while the e®ect on the I¤ region is ambiguous. If the increase in ¼H relative to ¼L does not
reduce ¼L + ¼H and does not signi¯cantly decrease the number of ¯rms using I¤; then the increase
in ¼H will indeed lead to greater turnover.
28(1999){ perhaps also encouraged by the enactment of new regulations.14 In reaction
to this tendency, our analysis suggests complementary changes in other elements of
the governance system. Suppose that, e.g. due to technological progress, pay-for-
performance compensation becomes more e®ective (in terms of Figure 2, pL falls).
Then, across ¯rms with independent boards, the move towards greater performance
sensitivity may allow savings on severance pay and an increase in turnover (that is,
a full move from I¤¤ to I¤). However, across ¯rms with a CEO-controlled board, the
change might increase the entrenchment tendencies of managers and hence call for
either an increase in severance pay or a shift towards greater board independence
(that is, a full move from D¤ to I¤).
The previous argument relates to another implication of our analysis: that sever-
ance pay and performance-based compensation complement each other (that is, move
in the same direction in response to parameter changes) in CEO-controlled boards,
while they may substitute each other (sometimes move in opposite directions in re-
sponse to those changes) in independent boards. The result is formally stated for the
case in which the varying parameter is C.
Proposition 7 Consider a sample of ¯rms that di®er in C. Then, performance-
based compensation (i.e., w) and severance pay (i.e., s) will be negatively correlated
across ¯rms with an independent board, while they will be positively correlated across
¯rms with a CEO-controlled board.
The empirical linkages between managerial compensation and boards have not
been carefully examined. A ¯rst step is given by Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999)
who report that CEOs earn greater total compensation when governance structures
are less e®ective and that increasing the percentage of inside directors in the board
14New Compensation Disclosure Rules have been required by the SEC and the Internal Revenue
Code has introduced limits to the tax deductibility of any non-performance-related pay in excess of
one million dollars. See Perry and Zenner (1997) for details.
29reduces all measures of CEO compensation, as well as the ratio of variable to total
compensation. While this last reported fact seems in line with our predictions, more
empirical work in this area is required before we can make a fair assessment of the
empirical validity of the results presented here.
We should conclude this section with a note of caution. We have o®ered an in-
tegrated analysis of CEO compensation and boards as mechanisms of corporate gov-
ernance. In the next section we further extend the picture by considering takeovers.
Yet, to keep things tractable, we have ignored the role of ¯nancial mechanisms, i.e.,
leverage and bankruptcy.15 Our work is thus complementary to Berkovitch, Israel,
and Spiegel (1998), where the interactions between CEO compensation and capital
structure are examined in detail. In particular they identify circumstances in which is-
suing risky debt makes the replacement policy more aggressive, while the use of golden
parachutes, like in our independent board, makes it less aggressive. They also o®er a
rich set of predictions related to the e®ects of replacement decisions and changes in
managerial compensation on ¯rm value and the impact of leverage on compensation
and turnover. Until a comprehensive model in which CEO compensation interacts
with both governance and capital structure is developed, the empirical work should
consider both sets of predictions, theirs and ours, as non mutually exclusive.16 If
anything, identifying potential interactions between governance and capital structure
in the data would provide a useful guidance for future theoretical work.
15In particular, we have adopted a distribution of terminal cash °ow under which the distinction
between debt and equity is irrelevant.
16There is, however, one exception. Berkovitch et al. (1998) predict a fall in value after CEO
replacement whereas our model predicts that ¯rm value would raise.
306 The Takeover Mechanism
Until now we have analyzed di®erent corporate governance structures in the absence
of takeovers. We now introduce takeovers threats, i.e., the possibility that an insur-
gent shareholder (or group of shareholders) might act to alter the composition of the
board and change the decision on CEO replacement, and examine how such threats
can a®ect the optimal governance structures derived above. For brevity, instead of
performing a complete analysis of the extended model, we will focus on two major
and contrasting insights. First, on the possibility that, by impeding ex-post transfers
of surplus to the CEO after a major improvement such as qH, \excessive" takeover
pressure may eliminate, de facto, our previous rationale for CEO-controlled boards.
Second, on how \moderate" takeovers threats can complement CEO-controlled boards
at implementing a \soft" replacement policy like that in I¤¤ but without costly sev-
erance pay or costly renegotiations prior to the replacement of the incumbent.
6.1 A simple model of takeovers
We consider the possibility that a takeover can occur after the uncertainty on the
availability of a rival manager is resolved but before the board of directors has decided
on replacement. In a set-up similar to Grossman and Hart (1980), we assume the
existence of a large shareholder with a fraction ® of the ¯rm who, to control the
board, needs to organize a costly takeover bid. The administrative costs of the bid
are Á > 0. We assume that the remaining shareholders consider themselves non-
pivotal for the success or failure of the takeover and that the pair (p;q) is public
information at the time of the bid. If the bid succeeds, the bidder gets control of
the board and the decisions (and renegotiations) on replacement take place as in our
previous independent-board case.
The minimum price at which shareholders will tender their shares in a successful
31bid equals the value that those shares are expected to reach under the resulting new
board of directors. Therefore the bidder only bene¯ts from the transaction through
the increase in the value of her pre-existing shares. Anticipating this, the tender o®er
will occur if:
®G > Á, (17)
where G represents the gains to shareholders (incremental cash °ow net of payments
to the incumbent CEO) induced by the change in the control of the board.17
An implication of (17) is that takeovers would not occur if the board of directors is
originally independent: the bidder's control of the board is allocationally identical to
shareholders' control, so we have G = 0 in that case. Hence the arrangements previ-
ously denoted by I¤ and I¤¤ continue to be potentially optimal corporate governance
structures in the world with takeovers. In this set-up, the possibility of takeovers
does not change anything in corporations whose boards are independent and thereby
aligned with shareholders' interest at all times.
6.2 Takeovers and CEO-controlled boards
In contrast to the case of an independent board, in a CEO-controlled board takeover
threats can have important consequences. If a rival manager is discovered one or
several shareholders might be tempted to organize a takeover bid to gain full control
of the board. In particular they may want to intervene to implement a managerial
improvement that would be ignored by the CEO-controlled board or, simply, to make
shareholders obtain more surplus in the renegotiations on replacement. Consequently
in the presence of takeover threats, incentives and optimal managerial compensation
under an initially CEO-controlled board change quite a bit relative to our discussion
in Section 4.
17Absent dilution, the free-rider problem among shareholders makes toeholds (® > 0) essential for
the pro¯tability of takeover bids (see Shleifer and Vishny (1986)).
32The possibility of takeovers can produce two major e®ects on the optimal gover-
nance structures derived before. First, strong takeover threats, arising from either
large toeholds ® and/or small administrative costs Á, would eliminate the bene¯t of
yielding control of the board to the CEO. A governance structure like D¤ is no longer
e®ective if the renegotiation on replacement following the incumbent's resistance to
step down is undermined by the success of a hostile bid that introduces a new, share-
holder oriented, board. Governance will then be forced to be carried through with
structures that work, de facto, such as I¤ and I¤¤. Hence if D¤ was optimal without
takeover threats, their presence will cause a loss of value to shareholders.18
A second e®ect occurs in the presence of less stringent takeover threats. In some
circumstances a combination of a CEO-controlled board with the takeover mechanism
will dominate any of the independent board arrangements. Such a combination may
implement the same selective replacement rule that characterizes I¤¤ and the old D¤
but with important advantages. First, relative to I¤¤, it may not be necessary to
rely on severance pay to deter shareholders from excessive intervention, since the
constraint on shareholder activism imposed by (17) may su±ce. Second, relative
to D¤, replacing the manager in (pH;qH) will be cheaper to shareholders, since the
takeover organized at that point will transform the opposing CEO-controlled board
into an independent board.
To illustrate this possibility in a simple way, we will consider the case in which pL =
0 what suppresses our previous rationale for CEO-controlled boards19 and restrict
attention to CEO-controlled boards accompanied by initial compensation schemes
18This e®ect is related to Stein (1991) who shows that protecting managers from excessive takeover
pressure may improve their incentives to undertake long-term investments.
19With pL = 0 the use of performance-based compensation does not generate any extra managerial
rent because success occurs with positive probability only if the incumbent chooses pH. Compare
(6) with (16) to check that, if pL = 0, D¤ is strictly dominated by I¤.
33with s = 0:20
Proposition 8 Denote by Gij shareholders' gains from transforming a CEO-controlled
board into an independent board in state (pi;qj): Then,
GLH ¸ GHH ¸ GHL and GLH ¸ GLL ¸ GHL: (18)
This proposition implies that the state in which a takeover is most likely to occur
is (pL;qH) and that in which it is least likely to occur is (pH;qL). As mentioned before,
for low values of
Á
® a CEO-controlled board will work, de facto as an independent one
and, in contrast, for high values of
Á
® takeovers will not be pro¯table in any state and
the board will remain under CEO control. However an interesting situation arises for
intermediate values of
Á
®; for which a takeover occurs and implements r = 1 in state
(pL;qL) but not in state (pH;qL):
The following result shows that there are circumstances in which such a governance
structure dominates the structures based on an independent board.





where ´ ´ minf(qL¡pH)R+
B¡¼LC
1¡¼H ; (1¡¼H)(qH ¡pH)R+(B¡¼LC)g. Then, there
is a governance structure with a CEO-controlled board and s = 0 that dominates the
independent board structures I¤ and I¤¤:
The main implication of the analysis is that the optimal type of board may de-
pend on the existence and intensity of takeover threats. While stringent takeover
threats would make inconsequential any ex-ante transfer of control to the CEO, in
the presence of moderate takeover activity shareholders may actually pro¯t from a
move towards more CEO control. More generally, di®erences in takeover activity over
20Under the conditions of Proposition 9 below this is without loss of generality.
34time or across countries (perhaps related to ¯nancial institutions or the availability
of ¯nance) may explain the variation in other aspects of corporate governance such
as board independence and the size of severance pay. Finally, we should notice that,
although the cost of takeovers has been taken as exogenous in the analysis, condi-
tion (19) suggests that ¯ne-tuning the parameters related to the aggressiveness of the
potential bidders may have value. For instance, anti-takeover amendments might be
useful in order to guarantee that takeover intervention is selective. In contrast, if the
incumbent CEO can adopt takeover defenses that make takeovers excessively costly,
a positive severance pay might conveniently reduce his incentive to resist.
7 Concluding Remarks
The analysis in this paper describes the advantages and disadvantages of protecting
managerial control rents and yielding to the incumbent CEO some control of the
decisions that a®ect these rents. The analysis focuses on the managerial replacement
decisions of the board of directors. Transferring control of the board of directors to
the CEO can reduce the need for incentive compensation, with the corresponding
saving for shareholders. However transferring control to the CEO promotes man-
agerial entrenchment and hence requires the use of other elements of compensation
(speci¯cally, severance pay) to adjust the incentives of the CEO to opportunistically
obstruct his own replacement.
The trade-o® between explicit managerial compensation and compensation in
terms of control rents and control rights o®ers novel insights on the rationale for
certain corporate governance structures. For example, it implies that an optimal
corporate governance structure may exhibit some of the usual features of managerial
entrenchment: low pay-performance sensitivity, high severance pay, and low manage-
rial turnover. So these features may re°ect a second-best response to the underlying
incentive problem.
35Our analysis of the linkages between managerial compensation and board structure
suggests several directions for empirical research. We predict that severance pay is
more likely to be used and will be larger in CEO-controlled boards than in independent
boards, and that the sensitivities of pay to performance are lower in the former than
in the latter. Our results also imply that severance pay substitutes for performance-
based compensation in independent boards (where both components typically move in
opposite directions in response to some parameter changes), while both complement
each other (that is, move together) in CEO-controlled boards. Finally, our predictions
suggest relating corporate governance structures to industry-speci¯c factors (such as
the prospects of external managerial innovation), CEO-speci¯c factors (such as his
age and the speci¯city of his human capital), the e®ectiveness performance-based
compensation (i.e., the precision of performance as a signal of managerial input), and
the level of takeover activity.
On the theoretical side, there is also interesting work ahead. We have o®ered
an integrated analysis of CEO compensation, boards, and takeovers but we have
ignored the role of ¯nancial mechanisms, i.e., leverage and bankruptcy. Providing a
more general yet tractable model in which CEO compensation interacts with both
governance and capital structure is a challenge left for future research.
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39APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 Suppose ¯rst that (2) holds so d = 0: In this case the
renegotiation will consist in ¯nding an alternative severance pay s0 ¸ 0 (expectably
lower than s) such that both parties end up (weakly) better o® setting r = 1 and
enforcing s0 rather that s. Given the status-quo payo®s associated with d = 0 under
the initial contract, the proposal s0 will be acceptable to the shareholders if it veri¯es
qR¡s0 ¸ p(R¡w); while it will be acceptable to the CEO if it veri¯es s0 ¸ pw +C.
The compatibility of these two inequalities requires that there exists s0 such that
pw + (q ¡ p)R ¸ s
0 ¸ pw + C:
Thus if
(q ¡ p)R ¸ C; (20)
the renegotiation will lead to r = 1: In particular, according to the assumed renego-
tiation procedure, the incumbent CEO will make a take-it-or-leave-o®er s0 = pw +
(q ¡ p)R to the shareholders, leaving them at their status-quo level of utility. The
pecuniary compensation of the CEO will then be
W = pw + (q ¡ p)R:
In contrast, if condition (20) fails, the ¯nal replacement decision will be r = d = 0;
and the expected pecuniary compensation of the CEO will be
W = pw;
as stipulated in the initial contract.
Suppose next that condition (2) does not hold so d = 1: In this case the renegoti-
ation will consist in specifying an alternative salary w0 ¸ 0 (expectably lower than w)
for the incumbent CEO such that both parties end up (weakly) better o® setting r = 0
and enforcing w0 rather than w. Given the status-quo payo®s associated with d = 1
40under the initial contract, a mutually acceptable w0 should satisfy p(R¡w0) ¸ qR¡s
on the shareholders' side, and pw0 + C ¸ s on the CEO side. These two inequalities
imply
(q ¡ p)R · s ¡ pw
0 · C:
Hence, a mutually bene¯cial renegotiation requires both
(q ¡ p)R · C; (21)
and, by the non-negativity of w0,
s ¸ (q ¡ p)R: (22)
Thus, if conditions (21) and (22) are satis¯ed, the renegotiation will lead to r = 0:
In particular, according to the assumed renegotiation procedure, the incumbent CEO
will make a take-it-or-leave-o®er pw0 = s¡(q¡p)R to the shareholders, leaving them
at their status-quo level of utility. The expected pecuniary compensation of the CEO
will then be
W = s ¡ (q ¡ p)R:
In contrast, if either (21) or (22) fail, the ¯nal replacement decision will be r = d = 1;
and the pecuniary compensation of the CEO will be
W = s;
as stipulated in the initial contract. After some reordering of the relevant conditions,
we get the results stated in the proposition.21¥
Proof of Proposition 2 Using Proposition 1 (together with prior observations
about the case q = 0) we can obtain an explicit expression for the manager's expected
21In cases of indi®erence about the ¯nal replacement decision, we break the tie w.l.o.g. by assuming
that the incumbent CEO keeps his job.
41income when he does not invest:
Eq [W + (1 ¡ r)Cj pL] = ¼0(pLw + C) + ¼L minfpLw + (qL ¡ pL)R; sg
+¼H minfpLw + (qH ¡ pL)R; sg: (23)
This expression re°ects that the incumbent keeps his job only in case no rival manager
becomes available. When a rival manager appears, the incumbent receives either the
initially contracted severance pay s; if it is not too high, or, otherwise, a new one
¯xed through renegotiation .
For the case the manager invests, our discussion following Proposition 1 suggests
considering two separate cases. Suppose ¯rst that s < (qL ¡ pH)R: Then
Eq[W + (1 ¡ r)Cj pH] = ¼0(pHw + C) + ¼Ls + ¼H minfpHw + (qH ¡ pH)R; sg;
where the last two terms are obtained from Proposition 1 noting that (qL¡pH)R < C
and (qH¡pH)R > C; respectively. Moreover, since pHw+(qH¡pH)R > (qL¡pH)R >
s; the last term simpli¯es to ¼Hs. So we have
Eq[W + (1 ¡ r)Cj pH] = ¼0(pHw + C) + ¼Ls + ¼Hs:
For similar reasons, the last two terms in (23) also simplify to ¼Ls and ¼Hs; respec-
tively. Thus the incentive compatibility condition (3) reduces to:
¼0¢w ¸ B:
Suppose next that s ¸ (qL ¡ pH)R: Then if p = pH; the incumbent will keep his
job both when q = 0 and when q = qL; so we have
Eq[W + (1 ¡ r)C j pH] = ¼0(pHw + C) + ¼L[minfpHw;s ¡ (qL ¡ pH)Rg + C]
+¼H minfpHw + (qH ¡ pH)R;sg;
which, in order to facilitate the comparison with (23), can be reordered as follows:
Eq[W + (1 ¡ r)C j pH] = ¼0(pHw + C) + ¼L minfpHw + (qL-pH)R;sg
+¼H minfpHw + (qH ¡ pH)R;sg + ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R](24)
42Interestingly, the severance pay s only a®ects the second and third terms in (23) and
(24). Comparing them pairwise makes clear that
¼j minfpLw + (qj ¡ pL)R; sg ¸ ¼j minfpHw + (qj ¡ pH)R; sg;
for all s ¸ (qL ¡ pH)R; w · R; and j = L;H: Moreover, within the speci¯ed ranges
for s and w, this relationship holds with equality for j = L;H only if s = (qL¡pH)R:
For this value of s; the incentive compatibility condition (3) reduces to:
¼0¢w + ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R] ¸ B;
whereas for values of s above (qL ¡ pH)R some extra negative terms will appear in
the LHS, tightening the corresponding constraint on w.¥
Proof of Proposition 3 Suppose ¯rst that the optimal contract speci¯es s <
(qL¡pH)R so that r = 1 at (pH;qL). Then the decisions (and possible renegotiations)
on replacement imply
V = ¼0pH(R ¡ w) + ¼L(qLR ¡ s) + ¼H(qHR ¡ s);
whereas incentive compatibility requires that (4) is satis¯ed. Clearly, since V is











I = AR ¡
pH
¢
B + ¼L(qL ¡ pH)R;
where A = (¼0 + ¼L)pH + ¼HqH.
Suppose next that the optimal contract speci¯es s ¸ (qL ¡ pH)R so that r = 0
at (pH;qL). In this case the decisions (and possible renegotiations) on replacement
43imply
V = ¼0pH(R ¡ w) + ¼L[pHR ¡ minfpHw; s ¡ (qL ¡ pH)Rg]
+¼H[qHR ¡ minfpHw + (qH ¡ pH)R; sg]:
This expression is also decreasing in w and s: Moreover we have already discussed
that setting s > (qL ¡pH)R would tighten the corresponding incentive compatibility






B ¡ ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R]
¼0¢
is the bonus that satis¯es (5) with equality, whereas
s
¤¤
I = (qL ¡ pH)R
is the minimum severance pay that dissuades shareholders from replacing the incum-
bent manager at (pH;qL): Under this contract, shareholders will get
V
¤¤
I = AR ¡
pH
¢
[B ¡ ¼L[C ¡ (qL ¡ pH)R]] ¡ ¼H(qL ¡ pH)R:
The comparison of V ¤
I and V ¤¤
I determines which contract is the best.¥
Proof of Proposition 4 To examine the various renegotiation possibilities, sup-
pose ¯rst that either (11) or (12) fail so d = 0: The renegotiation will then consist in
¯nding an alternative severance pay s0 ¸ 0 (expectably higher than s) such that both
the CEO and the shareholders gain by setting r = 1 and enforcing s0: Given the status-
quo payo®s, a proposal s0 is acceptable to shareholders if it veri¯es qR¡s0 ¸ p(R¡w);
while it is acceptable to the CEO if it veri¯es s0 ¸ pw+C. The compatibility of these
two inequalities requires
(q ¡ p)R ¸ C; (25)
in which case renegotiation will lead to r = 1 and a take-it-or-leave-o®er s0 = pw +
(q ¡ p)R from the CEO to the shareholders such that his pecuniary compensation
44will end up being
W = pw + (q ¡ p)R:
In contrast, if condition (25) fails, the ¯nal replacement decision will be r = d = 0;
and the (expected) pecuniary compensation of the CEO will be
W = pw;
as stipulated in the initial contract.
Suppose next that conditions (11) and (12) hold so d = 1: In this case the rene-
gotiation will consist in specifying an alternative salary w0 ¸ 0 (expectably higher
than w) for the incumbent CEO such that both parties end up (weakly) better o®
setting r = 0 and enforcing w0 rather than w. Given the status-quo payo®s associ-
ated with d = 1 under the initial contract, a mutually acceptable w0 should satisfy
p(R¡w0) ¸ qR¡s on the shareholders' side, and pw0 +C ¸ s on the CEO side. But
then, a mutually bene¯cial renegotiation requires
(q ¡ p)R · C;
which is impossible given (11) and (12). Therefore the ¯nal replacement decision
will be r = d = 1; and the pecuniary compensation of the CEO will be W = s,
as stipulated in the initial contract. Reordering the relevant conditions, we get the
results stated in the proposition.¥
Proof of Proposition 5 Proposition 4 suggests considering contracts within three
classes: (a) s · pLw+C; (b) pLw+C < s · pHw+C; and (c) s > pHw+C: Consider
¯rst contracts of class (b). The value of the ¯rm is
V = AR ¡ pHw ¡ ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R; (26)
which is decreasing in w and independent of s; while the incentive compatibility
constraint (13) requires
¼0¢w + ¼L(pHw ¡ s) + ¼H(pHw ¡ s) + ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R ¸ B ¡ ¼LC; (27)
45which imposes a lower bound on w: Since reducing s loosens the bound on w but is
innocuous for (26), the best contract within this class implies a severance pay at the










D = AR ¡
pH
¢
[B ¡ ¼H[(qH ¡ pH)R ¡ C]] ¡ ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R:
Notice that the non-negativity of w¤
D is guaranteed by the assumption B > ¼H[(qH ¡
pH)R ¡ C].
Consider next contracts of class (a). Shareholders' payo® has the same expression
as in (26), decreasing in w and independent of s: However the incentive compatibility
condition is now
¢w ¡ ¼L(qL ¡ pL)R ¡ ¼H¢R ¸ B ¡ ¼LC;
that imposes a lower bound on w clearly larger than w¤
D: Hence any contract of class
(a) will be strictly dominated by the already identi¯ed best contract of class (b).
Consider ¯nally contracts of class (c). The value of the ¯rm is
V = AR ¡ ¼0pHw ¡ ¼LpHw ¡ ¼Hs; (28)
which is decreasing in both w and s; while the incentive compatibility constraint
requires
¼0¢w + ¼L(pHw ¡ s) ¸ B ¡ ¼LC; (29)
which imposes a lower bound on w. Since reducing s loosens the bound on w and
increases (28), the best contract within this class implies a severance pay at the
minimum admissible value s = pHw + C. Under this choice, the lowest value of w









One can easily check, however, that ¼0 < 1 and (qH ¡ pH)R > C imply V ¤
D > ^ V .
Hence the best contract of class (c) is also dominated by the already identi¯ed best
contract of class (b), which, consequently, is the optimal contract.¥
Proof of Proposition 6 The argument is based on Figure 2. Condition V ¤
I = V ¤¤
I
is equivalent to
[(¼L + ¼H)(pH ¡ pL) + ¼LpH](qL ¡ pH)R ¡ ¼LpHC = 0;
that de¯nes the downward sloping straight line L1 in the ¯gure. This line goes through
the point (pL;C) = (pH;(qL ¡pH)R); which is denoted by P1. Points below L1 imply
V ¤
I > V ¤¤
I . Similarly, condition V ¤
I = V ¤
D is equivalent to
[¼LpH (qL ¡ pH) ¡ (¼L + ¼H)pL (qH ¡ pH)]R + ¼HpHC = 0;
that de¯nes the upward sloping line L2: This line passes through the point (pL;C) =
(pH;(qH ¡ pH)R); which is denoted by P2. Points to the left of L2 imply V ¤
I > V ¤
D.
Finally, the condition V ¤¤
I = V ¤
D is equivalent to
[(¼L + ¼H)pH (qL ¡ pH) + ¼HpL (qH ¡ qL)]R ¡ (¼L + ¼H)pHC = 0
that de¯nes the upward sloping line L3 (with slope smaller than that of L2) that
passes through the point (pL;C) = (0;(qL ¡ pH)R); which is denoted by P3. Points
to the left of L3 imply V ¤¤
I > V ¤
D. The three lines intersect at a single point and
end up dividing the parameter space in the three regions depicted in Figure 2. To
prove the results stated in the proposition, notice that changes in ¼H and ¼L do not
move P1; P2, and P3 but produce rotations in L1; L2, and L3 around these points.
In particular, increasing ¼H relative to ¼L increases the absolute value of the slope
of L1; decreases the slope of L2 and increases the slope of L3: The implied changes
47expand the region where D¤ dominates and contract the region where I¤¤ dominates,
which proves the result.¥
Proof of Proposition 7 Consider ¯rst the ¯rms with an independent board. Ac-
cording to Figure 2, if C is low they will use I¤; that is, w = w¤
I > w¤¤
I and s = 0 < s¤¤
I ;
where w¤
I is invariant to C. As C increases, ¯rms will switch to I¤¤; where w¤¤
I is de-
creasing in C; while s¤¤
I is invariant to C -see Proposition 3. Consider next the ¯rms
with a dependent board. In this case all of them use w = w¤
D; which is increasing in
C; and s = s¤
D; which is also increasing in C -see Proposition 5.¥
Proof of Proposition 8 To compute Gij for i;j = L;H; notice that if no takeover
occurs in a state (pi;qj); then the renegotiations on replacement at the CEO-controlled
board given s = 0 will leave shareholders at their status quo payo® pi(R ¡ w), ir-
respectively of the ¯nal decision on r: In contrast, if a takeover sets an independent
board, then shareholders can directly choose r = 1 and guarantee themselves a payo®
of qjR: Thus
Gij = (qj ¡ pi) + piw; (30)
which implies the ordering stated in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 9 By (17), for a CEO-controlled board cum takeovers to





which, from Proposition 8, implies takeovers occur in (pL;qL) and (pL;qH); but not
in (pH;qL): However, depending on the relative position of GHH and
Á
® they may or
may not occur also in (pH;qH):
Case 1. Suppose GHH >
Á
®; so a takeover occurs also in (pH;qH): Together with (30)
48and (31), this means that w must satisfy
(qL ¡ pH)R + pHw <
Á
®
< minfqLR; (qH ¡ pH)R + pHwg: (32)
But, given the associated replacement policy, the incentive compatibility condition
for p = pH requires:
¼0(pHw + C) + ¼L(pHw + C) + ¼H0 ¸ B + ¼0C + ¼L0 + ¼H0:




















Case 2. Suppose GHH >
Á
®; so there is no takeover in (pH;qH): Together with (30)
and (31), this means that w must satisfy




Considering the renegotiation that will occur in state (pH;qH); the incentive compat-
ibility condition now becomes:
pHw + ¼0C + ¼LC + ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R ¸ B + ¼0C;
which is binding for
w =
B ¡ ¼LC ¡ ¼H(qH ¡ pH)R
pH
:




2 ((¼0 + ¼L)(qH ¡ pH)R + B ¡ ¼LC; qLR):
The union of the intervals obtained in each of the two cases gives the interval in
condition (19). Finally, notice that in both cases the proposed contract yields a value
for shareholders of AR ¡ B + ¼LC > maxfV ¤
I ; V ¤¤
I g.
49